

EARTHQUAKE RELIEF FDPMU-EAST 3 ISLAMABAD PAKISTAN 15 OCT-20 DEC 05

TOPIC: LACK OF LINE OF ACCOUNTING

LESSON LEARNED: Lack of accounting data before deployment was an obstacle that made traveling via Air Mobility Command (AMC) difficult. Even though space available flights were used to move the team, a line of accounting is required.

RECOMMENDATION: Obtain line of accounting as early as possible, preferably prior to departing command.

TOPIC: LACK OF DEDICATED LIFT

LESSON LEARNED: Secure dedicated transport as early as possible once the mission is defined. **RECOMMENDATION:** Plan for dedicated transportation to/from site of mission; waiting for flights of opportunity (particularly from Bahrain to Chaklala Air Base, Islamabad) wasted time and resources.

TOPIC: INACCURATE REQUEST-FOR-FORCES

LESSON LEARNED: Clearly authenticate and define number of personnel requested.

RECOMMENDATION: Prior to personnel packing and departing, clearly and definitively determine the FDPMU mission and total population at risk. The initial RFF stated 10 personnel; in Bahrain, only 2 individuals were authorized to travel to Pakistan, then 2 more, and one was then requested to re-deploy (3 personnel remained). The overall troop strength was initially projected at 5500 and has decreased to approximately 1000, necessitating a modification to the initial RFF. This was beyond our control and a consequence of an evolving mission.

TOPIC: UNCLEAR MISSION UPON ARRIVING AT CHAKLALA AIR BASE, ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN.

LESSON LEARNED: The mission (receiving) chain-of-command must be aware of all incoming personnel, their respective capabilities, and their specific mission.

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that the RFF-generating individual has clearly explained to the receiving chain-of-command the capabilities, resources, and exact footprint of the incoming personnel and assets. The receiving command should be aware of, comfortable with, and be willing to accept the above and accept all FDPMU recommendations.



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TOPIC: LACK OF SENIOR MEDICAL OFFICER IN CHAIN OF COMMAND

LESSON LEARNED: Include a senior physician as planner or advisor in chain of command.

RECOMMENDATION: In order to accurately surmise and present medical information to the chain of command, it is crucial to include an experienced senior (0-6) physician as the task force surgeon, particularly in a purported humanitarian mission. Medical planners without a clinical background have little ability to convey the information (e.g. communicable disease, triage, etc.) that influences appropriate decision-making and transition planning. Such inclusion would also ensure that preventive medicine and public health is not an afterthought - that it is essential.

TOPIC: LIMITED VISIBILITY ON DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AMONG THE POPULATION

LESSON LEARNED: Plan to allow military public health personnel to interact with international organizations (IO); this permits appropriate visibility on diseases that may impact US troops. RECOMMENDATION: Military PM/PH personnel were initially restricted in their activities outside the military camps. Consequently, we were left guessing in response to inquiries about specific reports of communicable diseases such as diarrhea, diphtheria, and measles. It is crucial to permit military PM assets the ability to collaborate with IOs/NGOs; this decision rests with the chain of command and local commanders, who should receive advice from senior physicians. Otherwise, we perform a disservice to our troops and severely limit our ability to gain medical intelligence.

TOPIC: COMMUNICATIONS AMONG PM ASSETS

LESSON LEARNED: Provision of cell phones enhances PM mission effectiveness

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that at least 1 person from each PM team has a cellular phone. This promotes job

effectiveness and increases productivity.



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TOPIC: LACK OF NEHC DHL ACCOUNT

LESSON LEARNED: Having the ability to ship items that are mission- and time-sensitive is critical during deployment. Military air transport was sporadically available during this deployment and was consequently unreliable for shipping items that were time-sensitive. Commercial shipment was available and reliable. NEHC currently has a FEDEX account; however, access is not readily available to deployed units. Deployed units should be granted access to both FEDEX and DHL account information; this would allow the extra flexibility required in order to ship small quantities of mission-essential items rapidly. Shipping items via FEDEX works well if the service is available; DHL is more prevalent in European, Middle-Eastern, and African nations.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish generic FEDEX and DHL accounts available to deployed units on demand.

TOPIC: LIMITED TO NON-AVAILABILITY OF MOGAS (UNLEADED GASOLINE) DURING DEPLOYMENTS

LESSON LEARNED: Deploy with only diesel-operated equipment. FDPMU East-3 deployed with gasoline-powered generators from the training block that are currently in the process of being replaced. In addition, several pieces of vector control gear in the deployment block rely on gasoline - commercial replacements are not available. Throughout the deployment, it was extremely difficult (essentially impossible) to obtain unleaded gasoline.

RECOMMENDATION: Replace all gasoline-powered generators with diesel generators as soon as possible. In addition, emphasize the development of diesel-powered pesticide dispersal gear that is currently in the prototype stage at the Disease Vector Ecology and Control Center-Jacksonville.

TOPIC: WEAPONS TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES

LESSON LEARNED: The team experienced many problems traveling with weapons. The most obvious difficulty was that the first lift of opportunity (Italy to Bahrain) was not certified to carry ammunition, so the team did not carry ammunition at all. When the six team members returned from Bahrain, they were not allowed to bring the weapons on the aircraft supposedly because their orders did not allow them to travel with weapons. The weapons were subsequently shipped back. Note: no other commands (aside from the USMC and SeaBees) deployed with weapons/ammunition.



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RECOMMENDATION: EPM should research and provide specific requirements for carrying weapons and ammunition during FDPMU deployments. The requirements for weapons should also be defined prior to travel.

TOPIC: UIC FOR FOUR TO SIX PERSON FDPMU TO SUPPORT SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS

LESSON LEARNED: The initial 10 person FDPMU RFF was cut to a 3-person team shortly after forces were deployed ISO disaster relief operations. Currently, FDPMUs are configured as 10 to 13 person teams. A large logistics chain also follows the 10-13 person FDPMU as well.

RECOMMENDATION: A four to six person FDPMU should be formally created in order to support small-scale operations. A reduced logistic package must also be tailored in order to support short contingencies that specify a reduced footprint. This four to six person team should posses the ability to perform multiple EHSAs, provide disease surveillance, perform limited vector control missions, and perform basic health and sanitation inspections.

TOPIC: FUTURE FDPMU DEPLOYMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

LESSON LEARNED: The uncertain and evolving FDPMU mission in Pakistan unexpectedly resulted in participation within humanitarian outreach efforts in conjunction with CHPPM-Europe personnel. The FDPMU, despite being technologically prepared for environmental assessments, was unprepared for humanitarian outreach/assistance.

RECOMMENDATION: Consider developing several FDPMU Humanitarian Assistance blocks. These will primarily consist of consumables, such as gloves, bandages, syringes, etc.